See an invited perspective on this article on page 865.
How many aspirin, acetaminophen, or ibuprofen tablets will you take over your lifetime? How many antacid tablets? How about vitamin C tablets or atenolol? Probably the answer is thousands. How many doses of diagnostic radiopharmaceuticals will you take in a lifetime? A few, up to 10 or so, probably. The masses of unknown compounds in your aspirin, acetaminophen, ibuprofen, antacid, vitamin C, and atenolol (1) ( Table 1) are greater than the masses of many radiopharmaceuticals, often by 3-6 orders of magnitude (according to their U.S. Food and Drug Administration [FDA]-approved package inserts, except for 15 O-H 2 O, which is not FDA-approved) ( Table 2 ) . Some radiopharmaceuticals have masses on a par with the permitted unknown compounds of these nonradioactive drugs, often because of excess ligand in kits. Although mass in and of itself is not the most important safety aspect of a drug (toxicity is), we are not dealing with deadly molecules such as tetrodotoxin here. Most diagnostic radiopharmaceuticals belong to classes of drugs known not to be highly toxic in tiny masses.
The FDA does not know exactly what these contaminant compounds are in the nonradioactive drugs, but as long as the nonradioactive drug passes its toxicity testing, it is assumed that these contaminants are not important. In many cases there is only a heavy metal limit, generally in microgram quantities, but the FDA treats radiopharmaceuticals as ordinary drugs, requiring all the pharmacologic and toxicologic and animal testing on them anyway. This complicates the FDA's radiopharmaceutical approval process and increases its costs. A few decades ago, a "physician-sponsored investigational-new-drug application" was trivial, and human trials of new diagnostic radiopharmaceuticals could proceed without extensive pharmacologic, toxicologic, and animal testing. That is no longer the case. As far as the radiation from radiopharmaceuticals is concerned, we know what radiation at different levels causes (2), and we do not need to keep showing it repeatedly. When the FDA approves devices for radiation oncology, it is the physician who decides how much radiation to use from that device, and clinical trials of this factor are not required for device approval. FDA review of diagnostic radiopharmaceuticals merits a significant change in requirements, with each new radiopharmaceutical evaluated for what is truly necessary and sufficient to demonstrate safety and efficacy, instead of extensive and expensive one-size-fits-all requirements.
HISTORY
For us to see this problem in perspective, some history is in order. Modern nuclear medicine began in 1936, when John Lawrence in California treated polycythemia vera patients with 32 P-sodium phosphate made on the Berkeley cyclotron. A very short time later, physicians in Boston began using various radionuclides of iodine to study thyroid function, the radionuclides coming from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology cyclotron. The FDA did not regulate these radiopharmaceuticals, and as there was no radiation regulator, physicians did what they thought reasonable with no regulatory oversight except for state medical boards.
During the second world war, the physicists and radiochemists from Berkeley were swept into the Manhattan Project, and there was no one left at Berkeley to make the 32 P-sodium phosphate to ship all over the country for polycythemia vera therapy. Scientists at the topsecret Oak Ridge nuclear reactor, built to produce plutonium for atomic bombs, obligingly made 32 P on the reactor and shipped the 32 P-sodium phosphate to Berkeley, and from there it was delivered all over the country. The public did not realize what had been going on until after the war. In 1946, the Oak Ridge reactor scientists made 131 I-sodium iodide available for hyperthyroid and thyroid cancer diagnosis and therapy. When the Atomic Energy Act was passed in 1954 and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was formed, the AEC assumed regulation of radiopharmaceuticals (the FDA exempted radiopharmaceuticals from its regulatory purview). To do this, the AEC formed an advisory committee on medical uses of isotopes, and approval was fast and inexpensive. Their principal advisor was Captain William H. Briner, who would ask a manufacturer to send him some of its radiopharmaceutical. Captain Briner would test it for purity and stability, inject a few rats, and image them. If it was stable and went where it was supposed to go, they would try it on a few patients. If it still localized as expected, he told the AEC to approve it. When the AEC was broken up into what became the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 1974, Captain Briner remained a consultant to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which assumed regulatory authority over radiopharmaceuticals. Captain Briner estimated that with this regulatory system, it cost about $1,500 to get a new radiopharmaceutical approved. No radiopharmaceutical recommended for approval by Captain Briner was ever taken off the market for reasons of safety or efficacy. As the radiopharmaceutical industry grew, the AEC felt that it should not be involved in the approval of radiopharmaceuticals because it did not know anything about these drugs. The AEC wanted the FDA to lift its exemption for radiopharmaceuticals and take over their regulation. And so, the FDA did this in 1975. And things have become much more complicated since then.
The first problem was that the expertise of the FDA directors and staff of the imaging division (which included x-ray contrast agents) in radiopharmaceuticals was limited. They simply looked at radiopharmaceuticals as ordinary drugs that were also radioactive, and they demanded the same testing for radiopharmaceuticals as was required for traditional, nonradioactive drugs. The cost of getting a new radiopharmaceutical through the FDA kept growing as more requirements were imposed on the manufacturers. Instead of $1,500 to get a new drug approved, the costs went into the millions and tens of millions of dollars. And, of course, the costs of the diagnostic radiopharmaceuticals to patients once they were approved were also extremely high, as the manufacturers tried to recoup the development and regulatory costs. None of the new requirements of the FDA made the diagnostic radiopharmaceuticals any safer, because these tracers were generally safe to begin with. Thus, the FDA's regulatory approach did not contribute significantly to radiopharmaceutical safety.
Efficacy was simple under Captain Briner. If the agent went to the liver it was a liver scan agent. If it went to the lungs it was a lung scan agent. Nuclear medicine professionals and, more importantly, referring physicians, quickly understood whether a test was useful for their patients or not. Thus, given the safety of the approach, the users (physicians, patients) rather than the FDA decided whether a test was here to stay. The second problem arose with the FDA User Fee Program, initially opposed by the FDA, in which the FDA began charging manufacturers a user fee every year for every approved drug and every new approved indication. This led to an FDA situation in which radiopharmaceuticals were often approved only for limited indications, with the expectation that manufacturers would do more clinical trials for other indications. This resulted in more user fees paid to the FDA each year. Although physicians could use the radiopharmaceuticals for any indication they wanted, FDA-approved or not, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services often went into lock step with its sister agency the FDA and generally denied reimbursement for unlabeled indications. This put a financial penalty on physicians using radiopharmaceuticals for unlabeled indications and put pressure on manufacturers to perform more clinical trials. The FDA needs to return to appropriate pre-user-fee efficacy determinations. Acetylsalicylic acid (aspirin, 325-mg tablet) Aspirin contains no less than 99.5% and no more than 100.5% C 9 H 8 O 4 , calculated on a dried basis, of which no more than 0.014% can be as chloride, 0.04% as sulfate, 0.1% as free salicylic acid, and 10 μg as heavy metals per gram of aspirin. Therefore, there can be up to 1.6 mg of unknowns in a 325-mg tablet, of which 3.25 μg may be heavy metals.
Atenolol (50-mg tablet) Atenolol contains no less than 98.0% and no more than 102.0% C 14 H 22 N 2 O 3 , calculated on a dried basis. No more than 0.25% of any individual chromatographic impurity is found, and the sum of all chromatographic impurities is no more than 0.5%. Therefore, there can be up to 0.25 mg of unknown chromatographic impurity per 50-mg tablet, and there can be up to 0.75 mg of nonchromatographic impurity.
Ascorbic acid (vitamin C, 500-mg tablet) Ascorbic acid contains no less than 99.0% and no more than 100.5% C 6 H 8 O 6 , with no more than 0.002% heavy metals, or up to 10 μg per 500-mg tablet.
Rolaids (Chattem, Inc.) (CaCO 3 , 675 mg, and Mg(OH) 2 , 135 mg, in one tablet)
CaCO 3 contains no less than 98.0% and no more than 100.5% CaCO 3 . Heavy metal limit is 0.002%, or 13.5 μg/tablet; lead limit is 3 ppm (2 μg/tablet); arsenic limit is 3 ppm (2 μg/tablet); and mercury limit is 0.5 μg/g (0.33 μg/tablet). Mg(OH) 2 contains no less than 95.0% and no more than 100.5% Mg(OH) 2 . Heavy metal limit is 20 μg/g, or 2.7 μg/tablet, but lead is no more than 0.202 μg/tablet.
Ibuprofen (200-mg tablet)
Ibuprofen contains no less than 97.0% and no more than 103.0% C 13 H 18 O 2, calculated on an anhydrous basis. Heavy metal limit is 0.002%, or 4 μg/tablet.
